In re Tyrell J.: Children and Their Reasonable Expectations of Privacy by Davis, Shelley
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Notes and Comments Article 6
January 1995
In re Tyrell J.: Children and Their Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy
Shelley Davis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shelley Davis, In re Tyrell J.: Children and Their Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 25 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1995).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss2/6
NOTE 
IN RE TYRELL J.: CHILDREN AND THEIR 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a group of 
people who called themselves the "child savers" started a 
movement which resulted in the reformation of the juvenile 
justice system.1 Their primary goal was to eliminate the puni-
tive aspects of juvenile sentencing; replacing punishment with 
rehabilitation and training.2 Now, after 100 years of this "dif-
ferent look," what remains of an admirable attempt at modifi-
cation is a juvenile justice system which often confuses the 
people charged with its operation.3 Today, reformation efforts 
are perceived as attempts at justification. Modern courts con-
strue the phrase "best interests of the minor" so broadly that 
judicial reasoning is regularly infused with psychological rheto-
ric4 and basic constitutional liberties undergo idiosyncratic 
interpretations.5 
1. Roger B. McNally, Nearly a Century Later: the Child Savers - Child Advo-
cates and the Juvenile Justice System. 33 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 47 (1982). The au-
thor compares the child savers of the nineteenth century to present day child 
advocates. 
2. [d. at 50. 
3. See Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Pro-
tection Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 175 (1985). The 
author states, "[The parens patriae] doctrine, based on false assumptions and im-
practicable aims, justifies a juvenile court process that lacks clear goals and guide-
lines." [d. 
4. [d. at 186 n.53. 
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In re Tyrell J. 6 examines the parameters of warrantless 
searches of juvenile probationers. In Tyrell, the California 
Supreme Court limited the use of the exclusionary rule7 as 
applied to unconstitutional searches.s This note will discuss 
the history of the exclusionary rule and the probation search 
exceptions. The note will then examine the court's reasoning 
in Tyrell. The note will conclude by contending that the Tyrell 
majority disregarded the constitutional protections afforded 
adult citizens,9 and in effect reinterpreted the United States 
Supreme Court's "reasonableness standards."l0 
II. FACTS 
On October 3, 1991, at a high school football game, two 
police officers approached a trio of boys who they believed to be 
gang members.11 One of the police officers discovered that one 
of these boys was carrying a large hunting knife. 12 After find-
ing the knife, the officers detained the boys.13 One of the offi-
cers noticed that Tyrell J.'s pants were partially unzipped. 14 
This seemed "unusual" to the officer, so he conducted a pat 
search of the crotch of Tyrell J.'s pants. 15 As a result of the 
tional Sword, 22 GA. L. REV. 949 (1988) (discussing the many ways in which the 
constitutional rights of children are interpreted differently than the same rights as 
applied to adults). 
6. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994) (Per Lucas, C.J., with Arabian, J., 
Baxter, J., George, J., and Strankman, Presiding J., concurring. Separate dissent-
ing opinion written by Kennard, J., with Mosk, J., joining), modified, 94 C.D.D.S. 
8056 (1994). 
7. The exclusionary rule "commands that where evidence has been obtained 
in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990). 
8. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 532. The court denied the motion to suppress the evi-
dence, despite the fact that the officer was ignorant of the probation search condi-
tion. 
9. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting). "I 
cannot agree to this startling departure from settled principles underlying the 
Fourth Amendment, which guarantees '[tlhe right of the people to be secure in 
their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures ... :" [d. 
10. [d. at 536-37 (arguing that the majority's holding creates a "search first 
and ask questions later" policy). 
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search,16 the officer recovered a small bag of marijuana from 
Tyrell J.'s pants.17 
The officer subsequently filed a petition alleging that 
Tyrell J. came within the provisions of California Welfare and 
Institutions Code Section 602, which provided that a minor 
holding marijuana for sale was punishable by probation or 
physical confinement. IS Tyrell J. was already on probation, 
and a ward of the court due to a prior conviction for battery 
while on school grounds.19 Tyrell J. was aware that, under the 
terms of his probation,20 he would have to submit to a search 
of his person or property, with or without a warrant, by any 
law enforcement officer.21 Because of Tyrell J.'s status as a 
juvenile on probation, the marijuana seized was admitted into 
evidence in the juvenile court hearing, despite a defense mo-
tion to suppress.22 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforce-
ment officers and other government officials.23 Deciding wheth-
er or not a search is reasonable often requires after-the-fact 
analysis.24 Indeed, officers who try to ensure that they have 
16. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. The officer's in court testimony included the fact 
that even prior to the search, the officer did not believe the object to be a weap-
on. 
17. [d. 
18. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 725, 726 (Deering Supp. 1994) 
19. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 521. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. Individuals entitled to search Tyrell J. included law enforcement offi-
cers, probation officers, and school officials. 
22. [d. at 532. 
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
335 (1985) (expanding the category of persons who could conduct a reasonable 
search without warrant or probable cause to include school officials); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1960) (extending the protection of the exclusionary rule 
to the states); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1949) <extending the fourth 
amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizures to the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
24. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
3
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probable cause when conducting searches can be found, at a 
suppression hearing, to have made unconstitutional 
searches.25 In practice, the protections granted in the Fourth 
Amendment are usually enforced by the exclusion of any evi-
dence obtained in violation of this constitutional limitation. 26 
The exclusionary rule has been applied to juvenile proceed-
ings brought under the Welfare and Institutions Code Section 
602.27 This area of juvenile law provided protections parallel 
to the constitutional protections afforded adults.2s 
B. "SPECIAL NEEDS" EXCEPTIONS To THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
In order for the government to comply with the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment and to perform essential law 
enforcement and judicial functions, the law recognizes certain 
circumstances where the fourth amendment's warrant and 
probable cause requirements will not apply.29 Generally, these 
exceptions exist "when special needs, beyond the need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause require-
ment impracticable."30 
An example of a recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement is the search of the home of an adult probationer 
when an officer has information that there are guns contained 
within the premises.31 In such a case, the United States Su-
preme Court validates the search, provided that: (a) the proba-
tion officer assigned to the defendant performs a search pre-ap-
25. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that searches made 
pursuant to anonymous tips can be later invalidated due to insufficient probable 
cause). 
26. See Leon, 468 U.S. 897; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960); In re 
Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). 
27. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985). A petition filed under Califor-
nia Welfare and Institutions Code § 602 required a judicial determination of 
whether a juvenile violating any ordinance, other than one which creates an age-
based curfew, should become a ward of the court. Id. at 1298 n.17. 
28. Id. at 1298 n.17. 
29. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
30. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 523 (Cal. 1994) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment». 
31. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
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proved by his supervisor; and (b) reasonable grounds exist to 
believe that the defendant possesses contraband.32 A second 
exception validated the search of a student's purse by school 
officials after a teacher discovered the student smoking ciga-
rettes in a school restroom in violation of school rules.33 A 
third exception covered blood and urine tests required of rail-
road employees following on-the-job accidents.34 
These exceptions illustrate the broad range of rationales 
under which the United States Supreme Court has found "spe-
cial needs."35 Factors such as the location,36 status of the in-
dividuaV7 or the area searched,38 were not singularly deter-
minative in this context.39 Instead, the United States Su-
preme Court has balanced the privacy interests guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment against the promotion of various legiti-
mate governmental interests.4o 
The United States Supreme Court has applied this test to 
a variety of factual situations. The relaxation of warrant and 
32. [d. at 870-71. 
33. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. In denying a student's motion to suppress mari-
juana discovered in a student's purse after it was searched by school officials look-
ing for cigarettes, the Court created an exception to the probable cause and 
warrant requirements, based on the need to maintain order on school premises. 
[d. at 341. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches applies to school officials. 
[d. at 336-37. 
34. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Court 
created another exception, where workers in public transportation, because of pub-
lic safety issues, could be required to provide blood or urine for drug testing fol-
lowing on-the-job accidents. 
35. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
36. See Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (the location of the search was a private home); 
see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (the location of the search was a public school). 
37. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (the person searched was a student); see also 
Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (the person searched was an adult). Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 
(the person searched was an adult). 
38. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (the area searched was the bodily fluids of the 
drivers); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (the area searched was the detached handbag of a 
student). 
39. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
40. See Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (the interests were the need to rehabilitate pro-
bationers while keeping the public safe from convicted criminals out of custody). 
See also T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (the interests were the need for safety and control 
on public school sites); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (the interests were ensuring the 
safety of railway passengers). 
5
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probable cause requirements was justified by the need for 
supervision of adult probationers, to protect the community 
from non-incarcerated felons, and to ensure genuine rehabilita-
tion.41 A property search on public school grounds, once a rea-
sonable belief of the existence of hidden contraband arises, is 
validated by the school's need to maintain an appropriate 
learning environment.42 Mandated blood or urine tests of pub-
lic transportation workers following a collision is authorized by 
the need to ensure the safety of the traveling public.43 The 
United States Supreme Court requires clearly articulated, 
narrowly drawn governmental interests, before intrusion into 
areas of constitutional protection is allowed.44 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At a juvenile court hearing brought under California Wel-
fare and Institutions Code section 602, a juvenile court referee 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered 
during the search of Tyrell J.'s pants.45 Tyrell J. sought to 
suppress as evidence a small plastic bag of marijuana.46 The 
defense argued that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment's probable cause requirement.47 The government 
claimed that Tyrell J.'s probation search condition justified 
introduction of the evidence, despite the officer's lack of knowl-
edge of such condition.48 
41. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. 
42. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343. 
43. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618·21. 
44. In various areas of constitutional analysis, courts will use different "tests" 
devised by the U.S. Supreme Court, whereby the protected interest receives a 
certain level of protection, and the governmental interests presented must be suffi· 
cient to meet the "rational basis test," or to meet "strict scrutiny." See Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
45. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 522 (Cal. 1994). The motion was denied and 
Tyrell J. was declared a ward of the court. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. The motion to suppress was made under California Welfare and Insti· 
tutions Code § 700.1 (Deering Supp. 1994). In addition to making the motion to 
suppress, Tyrell J. denied the allegation that he possessed marijuana for the pur· 
poses of Bale. 
48. Id. at 522 n.1. 
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On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed the 
juvenile court's denial of the suppression motion.49 The appel-
late court found that "the fortuity of the search condition did 
not validate the otherwise improper search."50 The California 
Supreme Court heard the case following the State's petition for 
review.51 
V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In In re Tyrell J., the California Supreme Court ruled t~at 
the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press evidence obtained in the search of Tyrell J.'s pants.52 
The court reasoned that the police officer did not search an 
area that Tyrell could reasonably expect to remain private, 
therefore no Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 53 
The court identified two questions unresolved by previous 
courts. First, can a juvenile, like an adult, truly consent to the 
conditions of his probation.54 California appellate courts had 
addressed the issue of whether juvenile probation was equiva-
lent to adult probation. 55 However, the California Supreme 
Court had previously avoided the issue of juvenile consent to 
probation conditions. 56 Second, can a police officer conduct a 
warrantless search of any probationer without prior knowledge 
49. Id. at 522. 
50. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. 
51. Id. 
52. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994). Five out of seven justices 
joined in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the majority opinion in 
which three other justices and a presiding justice (assigned by the Acting Chair-
person of the Judicial Council) joined. Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting 
opinion in which Justice Mosk joined. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 526. The court, in discussing People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987), 
questioned whether the adult probationer's consent to waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment rights in exchange for avoidance of prison should be extended to juvenile 
probationers. Id. 
55. See In re Ronnie P., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 882 (Ct. App. 1992); see also In 
re Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Ct. App. 1992). 
56. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527. The California Supreme Court stated that a reso-
lution of the case issue by the "advance" consent rationale of Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 
would be improper. See also Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681-83. The California 
Court of Appeal avoided deciding the issue of consent. 
7
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of the probationer's status.57 In People v. Gallegos, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court analyzed the validity of a warrantless 
search of adult parolees by officers who had no prior knowl-
edge of the parole condition. 58 The court concluded that prior 
knowledge of parole status was necessary for a valid search in 
the absence of probable cause.59 However, the California Su-
preme Court had not extended this rule to cover searches of 
juvenile probationers,so and did not do so in its Tyrell deci-
sion.sl 
1. State Law Issues 
Since the passage of California's Proposition Eight,S2 vari-
ous questions have surfaced concerning the interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment protections provided by the United 
States Constitution.s3 In Tyrell, the court analyzed the possi-
ble impact of Proposition Eight on federal constitutional guar-
antees.54 A state may provide, via its Constitution or legisla-
ture, greater protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures than the Federal Constitution.s5 However, Proposi-
tion Eight appeared to limit, rather than expand, the 
57. Tyrell, 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
58. People v. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964). 
59. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 175. The court held that the search of an adult 
parolee's home was valid even through the officer searching the home was un-
aware of the defendant's parole status, since the detention was not made for rea-
sons of parole violation. See also In re Martinez, 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970). The 
searching office was not aware that the homeowner was on parole until after the 
arrest, when the defendant was at the police station. The court ruled that the 
evidence would be excluded from any criminal case based on the seizure, because 
no automatic search condition is imposed on parolees. Id. 
60. See Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 521 (acknowledging that lower courts had reached 
contrary results on this issue). 
61. Id. at 532. 
62. The voters of California passed the "Victim's Bill of Rights" in 1982, which 
amended Article I Section 28(d) of the California Constitution. It provided in perti-
nent part that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceed-
ings including . . . a hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in 
juvenile or adult court." CAL. CONST. art. I § 28(d). 
63. See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985); see also Alicia T. v. County 
of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1990). 
64. Tyrell. 876 P.2d at 524-25 
65. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 666 (1960) (extending the exclusionary rule to 
the states, provided this extension not reduce any existing protections within the 
state). 
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protections of the Fourth Amendment by reqUlnng that "no 
relevant evidence shall be excluded."66 The application of this 
state law has resulted in remedies other than exclusion for 
evidence seized in an unreasonable search.67 If there is no 
controlling United States Supreme Court decision on a federal 
question, a state court can adopt its own interpretation.68 
The United States Supreme Court had not ruled regarding 
the exclusion of evidence obtained in the manner of that in 
Tyrell. 69 Thus, in In re Tyrell J., the California Supreme 
Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment guarantees without 
the benefit of controlling United States Supreme Court prece-
dent.70 
2. Juvenile Probation versus Adult Probation 
The Tyrell court noted that adult probation involves a 
consensual waiver of certain Fourth Amendment rights in 
exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison 
term.7l Advance waiver of Fourth Amendment rights is per-
missible under the United States Constitution72 because state 
probation services present "special needs" beyond law enforce-
66. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). 
67. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 209 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1984) (providing 
that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used for 
certain purposes, such as impeachment); People v. West, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (allowing improperly obtained evidence to be admitted for purposes of 
sentence enhancement). 
68. See Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513, 517 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
69. Id. at 521. See In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard J., 
dissenting). "My research has not disclosed, nor has the majority cited, any deci-
sion, whether from a federal or a sister state court, that has relied on a search 
condition to uphold a search by an officer who did not know of the condition's 
existence." Id. at 534. 
70. See Alicia T., 271 Cal. Rptr. 513. The California Court of Appeal stated 
that without direct guidance form United States Supreme Court precedent, any 
other court is free to interpret federal constitutional protections. Id. 
71. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 526-27. See also People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 341 
(Cal. 1987). The California Supreme Court held that consent to probation requires 
that an adult probationer also give informed consent to a warrantless search of 
their person or property without a necessary showing of probable cause. Id. 
72. See id. at 341 (adult probationer consented to an advance waiver of Fourth 
Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a prison term). 
9
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ment that may justify departures from the usual warrant and 
probable cause requirement.73 
The Tyrell court next discussed the juvenile justice system. 
The court noted that the juvenile court, in making a minor a 
ward of the court under California Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 602, has a variety of options for disposition.74 
Furthermore, the unique functions and purposes of the juve-
nile system give rise to results which are different than those 
in the adult system.75 The court stated "[j]uvenile probation is 
not, as with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory 
punishment; it is an ingredient of a final order for the minor's 
reformation and rehabilitation."76 
In light of these differences, the Tyrell court reasoned that 
conditions of probation which would be "unconstitutional or 
otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permis-
sible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile 
court."77 Juvenile probation conditions would not be so broad 
as to infringe on constitutional rights if they are "tailored spe-
cifically to meet the needs of the juvenile.,,78 
The Tyrell court concluded that these fundamental differ-
ences, in both the purpose and enforcement of the law, create 
73. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987). 
74. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730(b) (Deering Supp. 1994). "[T)he court may 
make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward . . ." Id. These 
options include placement of the juvenile in home detention, detention of the juve-
nile in the facilities of the California Youth Authority, or a requirement that the 
juvenile attend drug or alcohol rehabilitation programs. Id. 
75. See In re Ronnie P., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 882 (Ct. App. 1992). The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal clarified how violations of dispositional orders are treated 
differently in the juvenile and adult systems. Id. Unlike adult probation, where 
violation of conditions can result in an additional criminal charge, in juvenile pro-
bation, the result is a complete review of the order. Id. 
76. Id. at 882. 
77. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 526. See also In re Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 682 
(Ct. App. 1992) (The California Court of Appeal reasoned that the purpose of reha-
bilitation allows juvenile probation conditions to fit the circumstances of the mi-
nor); In re Laylah K., 281 Cal. Rptr. 6, 7 (Ct. App. 1991) (an example of "gang 
terms and conditions of probation," included the following in the dispositional or-
der: A requirement to be home between 8:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.; no presence at 
any known gang gathering; no association with known gang members; submission 
to chemical testing; and submission to warrantless search and seizure). 
78. Binh. L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682. 
10
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disparate analyses of consent.79 Because a minor has no 
choice whether or not to consent to certain conditions of proba-
tion, there can be no consent to a condition of probation sub-
jecting him to a warrantless search.80 
3. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The Katz Test 
The In re Tyrell J. court next moved to a discussion of 
whether or not Tyrell J. could have had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.81 They turned their attention to Katz v. Unit-
ed States,82 where the United States Supreme Court created a 
two part test to determine whether a search is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. The first inquiry is whether 
the individual being searched has manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy.s3 The second prong questions whether 
society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.84 
Here, the Tyrell court found that the first prong of the 
Katz test was met when Tyrell J. tried to hide the marijuana 
in the crotch of his pants, clearly one of the most private plac-
es on the exterior of his body.s5 Thus, the court found that 
Tyrell J. manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.s6 
79. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527 (citing the consent requirements discussed in Peo-
ple v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987». 
80. Id. 
8l. Id. The court moved on to reasonable expectations of privacy' once the 
issue of consent was fully analyzed. Id. 
82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). 
83. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
84. Id. The second prong of the test requires an objective expectation by rea-
sonable members of society that the area searched is private. The Court went on 
to distinguish the privacy of a home from objects, activities, or statements exposed 
to the "plain view" of outsiders. 
85. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527; see People v. Pena Reyes, 273 Cal. Rptr. 61, 65 
(Ct. App. 1992) (discussing Clothing as an extension of the body). Id. 
86. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527. The court equated the situation at bar with the 
facts of California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986), in which a subjective ex-
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The majority found problems, however, with the second 
prong of the Katz test. The court cited two lower court opin-
ions which stated essentially that a juvenile probationer has 
"absolutely no reasonable expectation" to be free from a war-
rantless search of his person.S7 The Tyrell court compared 
these lower court holdings with cases involving adult proba-
tioners who have a "reduced expectation of privacy, therefore 
rendering certain intrusions by government authorities reason-
able ... to the extent that such intrusions are necessitated by 
legitimate governmental demand."ss California statutory 
law89 allows for various conditions of juvenile probation which 
create diminished expectations of privacy.90 
While the Tyrell court recognized the differences in the 
purposes of the two systems, the court concluded that the con-
trolling legal proposition remained the same whether the pro-
bationer was an adult or a juvenile. Thus, the relevant inquiry 
was whether the circumstances surrounding the challenged 
search reveal that the person's expectation of privacy is not 
" . . . one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and 
legitimate. "91 Concerning adults, there exists a need to prove 
legitimate governmental interests.92 In contrast, the fact of 
the juvenile's status as a probationer is strong evidence of a 
legitimate government interest, requiring no additional proof.93 
87. In re Marcellus L., 179 Cal. Rptr. 901, 908 (Ct. App. 1991). The California 
Court of Appeal held that a juvenile on probation was subject to a general search 
clause, and therefore a police officer unfamiliar with the youth was justified in 
performing a pat search after finding the minor sitting outside during school hours 
Id.; see also In re Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 684-85 (Ct. App. 1992). The court 
upheld a warrantless search by a police officer without knowledge of the pre-exist-
ing search conditions. The officer observed the youth in a car under "suspicious 
circumstances" and concluded that he was a truant, performed a pat down, and 
uncovered a gun. Id. 
88. People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1267 (Cal. 1986). 
89. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730(b) (Deering Supp. 1994). 
90. Conditions of probation include: counseling with parents (Id. § 729.2(b)); 
respect of curfew (Id. § 729.2(c)); submission to drug testing (ld. § 729.9); and 
participation in drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs (ld. § 729.10). 
91. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 528. 
92. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Burgener, 714 P.2d 
1251, 1266-67, for a discussion of how the interests apply directly to the 
probationer's expectations of privacy. Id. 
93. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The Tyrell court made certain 
assumptions that, because of the "lesser" status of juveniles, there was little or no 
showing of governmental interests required to justify a warrantless search of a 
12
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Because Tyrell J., as a juvenile probationer, was subject to 
a valid search condition, the court presumed that he had suffi-
cient awareness of the resulting limitations on his freedom.94 
Tyrell J. had no reason to believe that the officer would not 
search him.95 Therefore, the court concluded that any expecta-
tion of privacy in the marijuana was "manifestly unreason-
able.9s 
4. Effectuation of Policy: Deterrent Effects 
The court in Tyrell found that the condition of juvenile 
probation permitting the police, government officials, and oth-
ers,97 to conduct warrantless searches, attached without viola-
tion of the United States Constitution.9s Authorizing any law 
enforcement officer to stop and search a juvenile probationer 
was held99 consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of the 
juvenile law.10o The search is presumptively valid if it is not 
conducted for "reasons unrelated to the rehabilitative and 
reformative purposes of probation or other legitimate law en-
forcement purposes.,,101 The Tyrell court reasoned that these 
searches were consistent with the overriding policy of the juve-
nile court system because they deter future misconduct. 102 
In Tyrell, the court distinguished People v. Gallegos, 103 
where the California Supreme Court concluded that a search 
based upon insufficient information provided by an informant 
was improper, and excluded the evidence thereby obtained.104 
juvenile probationer. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 526. 
94. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 529-30. 
95. Id. 
96. Id at 530. 
97. Others holding the privilege to conduct warrantless searches include proba-
tion officers (In re Thomas M., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 711 (Ct. App. 1993» and 
school officials (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985». 
98. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 532. 
99. Id. 
100. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(b) (Deering Supp. 1994). The purposes of 
juvenile court law include providing care, treatment and guidance consistent with 
the best interests of the minor and of the public. Id. 
101. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 530 (citing People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 342 (Cal. 
1987». 
102. Id. 
103. People v. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 175 (Cal. 1964). 
104. Id. at 177. 
13
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The Tyrell court found distinguishable the fact that Mr. 
Gallegos first admitted, then actively denied that he was on 
parole. 105 Because there was no official validation of the 
defendant's status, the Gallegos court decided that the state-
ments of the searchee, when paired with a lack of probable 
cause, created an insufficient basis for the search. lOS 
Like other courts, juvenile courts are charged with the 
responsibility of explaining the ramifications of probation to 
prospective probationers. l07 Courts must not mislead juvenile 
probationers into believing that only officers aware of the pre-
existing conditions of probation will conduct searches. lOS Ab-
sent evidence of misrepresentation, the Tyrell court was not 
troubled by the lack of prior knowledge by the searching offi-
cer. l09 
The search itself was a necessary component of rehabilita-
tion in that it provided a strong deterrent against the tempta-
tion to return to antisocial ways.110 The Tyrell court stated 
105. Id. at 176-78. When awakened at 1:00 am, the defendant first told the 
arresting officers that he was on parole, and then denied the existence of the 
parole condition. Id. The California Supreme Court excluded evidence of drugs 
obtained by the officers because there was no corroboration of the defendant's 
status as a parolee. Id. 
106. Gallegos, 397 P.2d at 176-77. The court stated that a search following an 
illegal arrest cannot produce evidence necessary to justify the arrest. Id. Because 
the officers arrested Mr. Gallegos based solely upon drugs discovered during an 
illegal search, the non-corroborated parole status was insufficient for search or 
arrest. Id. In light of this, the Tyrell court found Gallegos distinguishable because 
the arrest resulting from the illegal search was for parole violation, not for posses-
sion. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 531. 
107. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 700 (Deering Supp. 1995). "[T)he judge shall 
explain any term of allegation contained therein and the nature of the hearing, its 
procedures, and possible consequences." Id. 
108. See In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Ct. App. 1978). A court order imposing 
weekend incarceration as a manual labor camp was unsuccessfully challenged. The 
California Court of Appeal held " . . . in imposing conditions of probation, the 
court is vested with a broad discretion in order to best serve the interests of the 
minors within its jurisdiction, and its exercise of that discretion will not be dis-
turbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion." Id. at 337. 
109. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 530. The court discussed the idea that so long as the 
search is not conducted in order to harass the juvenile, the lack of prior knowl-
edge should not make the search presumptively invalid. Id. 
110. Id. 
14
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that expanding the number of persons privileged to search 
increases the deterrent effect on juvenile probationers. l11 
Based on its analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy 
and possible deterrent effects, the court in Tyrell affirmed the 
lower court's denial of the motion to suppress the marijuana 
discovered in the search.112 The court concluded that Tyrell 
J.'s expectation of privacy was unreasonable because "society is 
unwilling to recognize it as legitimate," given his status as a 
juvenile probationer. 113 
B. THE DISSENT 
The two dissenting justices114 in In re Tyrell J., focused 
on two questions. First, they considered the issue of reliance 
on a search condition of which the searching officer was un-
aware. ll6 Second, they analyzed whether, even if this reliance 
can be justified, there should be a requirement that the search-
ing officer prove a "reasonable suspicion" that the juvenile is in 
violation of either a general law or the terms of the proba-
tion.H6 
In discussing the validity of the "later validated" search, 
the dissent found People v. Gallegos1l7 and in In re Marti-
nez118 to be dispositive. Unlike the Tyrell majority, the dis-
sent compared juvenile probationers to adult parolees and 
concluded that "a search may not be justified by a ... search 
condition of which the searching officer is unaware.,,119 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 532. 
113. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 532. The court analyzed Tyrell J.'s belief that the 
crotch of his pants was too private to be searched. Id. Because of the probation 
search condition, Tyrell J. should have understood that he was continually subject 
to search. Id. Due to this "continual search provision," any expectation that he 
could hide contraband in his pants does not fit within society's reasonableness 
standards. Id. 
114. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting; 
Mosk, J., concurring in the dissent). 
115. Id. at 532. 
116. Id. 
117. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964). 
118. Martinez, 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970). 
119. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 536. The dissent found the purposes underlying search 
15
Davis: Juvenile Justice
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
406 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:391 
Despite their refusal to validate any search by an officer 
unaware of the juvenile's probationary status, the Tyrell dis-
sent considered the showing of proof necessary to justify such a 
search.120 The dissenting justices found the majority's conclu-
sion, that the officers needed no reasonable suspicion of the 
violation of either a law or of probation conditions, to be a 
"startling departure from settled principles underlying the 
Fourth Amendment. "121 The dissent challenged as unsupport-
ed the majority's application of the "special needs" policy of 
Griffin v. Wisconsin. 122 The dissenting justices disagreed with 
the majority's assumption that the rehabilitation implications 
of juvenile probation create a situation where reasonable suspi-
cion has no place.123 
VI. CRITIQUE 
A. IGNORANCE As To THE STATUS OF THE DEFENDANT 
"[T]here is no rational basis upon which to uphold other-
wise illegal police searches of persons only later determined to 
be on probation or parole."124 In all areas of government ac-
tivity, reasonable people are not willing to tolerate an "act 
now, explain later" policy.125 Nevertheless, courts regularly 
allow admission of evidence based on after-the-fact discovery of 
probation search conditions,126 basing justification on the de-
conditions imposed for juvenile probationers as indistinguishable from those justify-
ing imposition of search conditions on adult parolees. Id. Based upon this conclu-
sion, the dissenting justices could find no support for a search where the officer 
was aware of the search conditions only after-the-fact. Id. 
120. [d. at 537-38. 
121. [d. at 532. 
122. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). The court held that the "special 
needs in operating a probation system allow for ongoing supervision" of the pro-
bationers, which can include warrantless searches when certain conditions are met. 
Id. at 875. 
123. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 537-38. 
124. 4 LA FAYE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 
§ 10.10(e), at 154-55 (2d ed. 1987). While the case law cited involved adult proba-
tioners/parolees, it can be reasonably inferred that since this statement is based 
solely on the Fourth Amendment, it applies equally to juveniles as well. 
125. See Bill Kisliuk, Police Given More Power to Search Juvenile Suspects; 
Court OKs Illegal Search, Youth was on Probation, THE RECORDER, July 29, 1994, 
at 1. In discussing reaction to the Tyrell decision, the reporter included comments 
from attorneys such as "lilt's the installment plan of the Fourth Amendment," and 
"lilt's a troubling decision because it offers that after-the-fact justification . . . " [d. 
126. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon held that the "good 
16
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terrent effect on the probationer. 127 In the area of juvenile 
law, this evidentiary trend takes on new meaning128 primari-
ly because of the lack of a true comparison between juvenile 
probation and adult probation.129 
In People v. Bravo,130 the California Supreme Court dif-
ferentiated between adult probation and parole, noting that 
only the adult probationer voluntarily waives certain Fourth 
Amendment rights in order to avoid prison.131 The adult pa-
rolee, in contrast, has no right to reject release on parole.132 
Like the adult parolee, the juvenile probationer lacks the op-
tion of declining his or her probation.133 Therefore, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's prior decisions regarding adult parol-
ees should be relevant in analyzing cases such as Tyrell. 134 
In People v. Gallegos 136 and In re Martinez,136 searches 
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule allows for admission of evidence which 
may only be admissible based upon some discovery after the initial search so long 
as the officer acts in "good faith" on a magistrate's authorization. Id. 
127. See generally In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Ct. App. 1991); In re 
Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Laylah K., 281 Cal. Rptr. 6 
(Ct. App. 1991), for the California Court of Appeal view on the broad discretion 
given to analysis of evidentiary matters when juvenile probationers are involved. 
128. See Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Criminal Law: Prosecuting Juve-
niles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L., 439 
(1985). The authors state "Uluvenile court history has again demonstrated that 
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substi-
tute for principle and procedure." Id. at 459. 
129. In re Tyrell, 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting). "The 
purposes underlying search conditions imposed for juvenile probationer, as de-
scribed by the majority are indistinguishable from those justifying the imposition 
of search conditions on adult parolees." Id. at 536. (emphasis added). 
130. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987). 
131. Id. at 341. 
132. Id. 
133. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting). In 
analysis of the consent issue, the dissent stated that juveniles cannot choose not 
to be placed on probation. Id. at 536-37. 
Id. 
134. Id. at 532. 
Unless they can be distinguished from the situation here, 
this court's decision in People v. Gallegos, 396 P.2d 174 
(Cal. 1964), and In re Martinez, 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970), 
are dispositive of the case at hand: they establish a rule 
now decades old, that the prosecution may not rely on a 
defendant's express or implied search condition when the 
police officer conducting the search did not know of its 
existence. 
135. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 174. 
17
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of adult parolees by officers lacking knowledge of the 
searchees' status were hold to be unconstitutional. 137 Argu-
ably, the juvenile probationer's situation is analogous to that of 
an adult parolee. Thus, the evidence discovered in In re Tyrell 
J. should have been excluded since it was illegally138 obtained 
from an individual whose status was equivalent to that of an 
adult parolee.139 
B. "REASONABLE BELIEF" 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that a search be based on probable cause, and that a 
proper warrant be issued prior to the search.140 The warrant-
less search of probationers is widely recognized as an exception 
to these requirements. 141 The In re Tyrell J. court expanded 
this particular exception to include juvenile probationers. 142 
The officer who filed the petition143 first observed Tyrell 
J. adjusting his pants.144 The officer assumed that Tyrell J. 
was trying to conceal something, conducted a pat search and 
felt a soft object approximately three by twelve inches. 145 
136. Martinez, 463 P.2d 734. 
137. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
138. See Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. The defendant argued that a lack of aware-
ness of probation conditions at the time of the search could cause the search to be 
declared illegal. Id. See also In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 535-36 (Cal. 1994) 
(Kennard, J., dissenting). In the amendment to the original dissent, this interpre-
tation of both Gallegos, 396 P.2d 174 and Martinez, 463 P.2d 734 was fully articu-
lated. 
139. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
"Even when the person searched has voluntarily accepted an express or implied 
search condition, that condition cannot justify a warrantless search by an officer 
engaged in general law enforcement duties who has no knowledge of the search 
condition." Id. at 536. 
140. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
142. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521 (Cal. 1994). In holding that Tyrell J. 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy, the California Supreme Court validated 
the admission of evidence uncovered in a warrantless search of a juvenile proba-
tioner, even when the searching officer is unaware of the search conditions. 
143. In juvenile proceedings under the California Welfare and Institutions Code 
§§ 602 and 603, an officer has the option of filing a petition in juvenile court al-
leging that the minor is a person who could be declared a ward of the court. Id. 
144. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. 
145. Id. at 75. 
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While the officer did not believe it was a weapon, he retrieved 
the object and found it to be marijuana.146 
Assuming arguendo, that the factors applicable to the 
search of an adult probationer applied equally to a juvenile, 
the rule from Griffin v. Wisconsin 147 requires "reasonable 
grounds to believe in the presence of contraband," before a 
warrantless search can be conducted.148 An officer must con-
sider a variety of factors in determining whether reasonable 
grounds exist. 149 The factors include: information from an in-
formant, the need to verify compliance with rules of supervi-
sion of state and federal law, and the officer's own experience 
with the probationer. 15o 
In Tyrell, no informant gave any information, and the 
officer lacked awareness of the need for supervision of the 
minor.15i Therefore, one can only assume that the officer re-
lied on his limited experience with Tyrell J. to justify this 
warrantless search.152 This experience appears to have con-
sisted of observing a teen-age boy, in the company of other 
teenagers, repeatedly adjusting the crotch of his trousers.153 
The officer then conducted a valid pat search, ordinarily 
done in order to detect the presence of any weapon, and when 
he felt a "soft object," he "reasonably believed" it to be contra-
band.154 Compare this situation to that in Minnesota v. 
146. ld. 
147. Griffin u. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
148. ld. at 870·71. 
149. ld. Wisconsin law, like that of a majority of states, requires a probation 
officer to prove to his supervisor that "reasonable grounds" exist to believe in the 
presence of contraband. [d. 
150. [d. at 871. The United States Supreme Court was careful to explicitly 
state what would constitute reasonable grounds for a probation officer to conduct a 
warrantless search of a probationer. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871 (emphasis added). 
151. Officer Villemin testified that he was unaware of the minor's search condi-
tion at the time of the search. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. 
152. See id. at 521-22, where the facts state that Officer Villemin observed 
Tyrell J. with a group of boys identified to him as gang members. [d. With no 
knowledge of the search condition or the identity of Tyrell J., and no search war-
rant, it seems clear that Officer Villemin relied on his experience in that very 
short period of time in deciding to search Tyrell J. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. 
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Dickerson, where an officer prodded and manipulated the 
clothed area of a suspect during a weapons search and discov-
ered crack cocaine.155 The cocaine was excluded at trial when 
the United States Supreme Court found the search and seizure 
without probable cause, as the officer was able to determine 
that there was no weapon before the extended manipulation of 
the clothing. 156 
While the Tyrell court's analysis of Griffin v. Wisconsin 157 
upholds the validity of the Tyrell search, the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in Minnesota v. Dickerson l5S indi-
cates a different result. Due to the Tyrell officer's ignorance of 
Tyrell J.'s status, the Griffin v. Wisconsin reasonable grounds 
requirements, which rest on the special needs associated with 
supervising probationers, are inapplicable. 159 However, ab-
sent support for Tyrell J.'s detention, and relying on the need 
to supervise probationers, the Minnesota v. Dickerson analysis 
posits an interesting scenario.160 The officer in Minnesota v. 
Dickerson only determined there was contraband after manipu-
lating the defendant's clothing during a weapons search "inci-
dent to the arrest."16l In contrast, in Tyrell, there was no 
"search incident to arrest" because there was no arrest until 
after the marijuana was discovered.162 Therefore, the officer 
155. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). 
156. [d. The Court found that the officer had gone beyond the parameters of a 
Terry stop. [d. A Terry stop requires reasonable suspicion that the person being 
searched is carrying a weapon. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). 
157. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
158. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2120. See supra note 153. 
159. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875-80. Because the Court in Griffin specifically dis-
cussed probation and the special needs resulting from the supervision of probation-
ers, the Tyrell J. searching officer (ignorant of Tyrell J.'s status) could hardly be 
held to have searched him in order to "supervise his probation." 
160. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130. The United States Supreme Court limited 
the scope of the "search incident to arrest." 
161. [d. In Dickerson, a police officer stopped the defendant, who was seen 
adjusting his clothes. [d. The officer conducted a pat search, and felt a bulge. [d. 
He manipulated the bulge between his fingers, and only then did he find that it 
was a rock of crack cocaine. [d. Because he was able to ascertain that it was not 
a weapon before he determined that it was contraband, the Court held that the 
search, and therefore the arrest were unconstitutional. Dickerson. 113 S. Ct. 2130 
(emphasis added). 
162. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 521-22. The facts state that the officers approached the 
three boys, asking them to "hold up." [d. Officer Villemin discovered the marijuana 
during a pat search after he had visually determined that it was not a weapon. 
[d. (emphasis added). Tyrell J. was not taken into custody until after the marijua-
20
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in Tyrell had no basis for the search, because he knew there 
was no threat to his safety.163 
C. STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICIAL 
The Tyrell majority decision, in large part, justified invok-
ing an exception to the exclusionary rule due to the "special 
needs" of rehabilitation existing in juvenile probation. l64 
Practically, both probation and parole rely on supervisory rela-
tionships between the probation/parole officers and the proba-
tioner/parolee.165 The probation officer is one "who, while as-
suredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also sup-
posed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer.,,166 
The officer who searched Tyrell J. was a police officer, not 
a probation officer.167 There was no ongoing supervisory rela-
tionship.16s Using a Griffin v. Wisconsin analysis, the after-
the-fact discovery of the probationary status was insufficient to 
uphold the validity of the search.169 Morover, the "special 
needs" of the probation system cannot be extended to a search 
na was discovered. Id. 
163. The facts state that Officer Villemin did not believe the object to be a 
weapon. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522. The Tyrell court, however, found that the officer 
did not conduct an unreasonable search because as a juvenile probationer subject 
to a search condition, Tyrell J. did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Id. at 529. 
164. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873. The United States Supreme Court discussed 
in detail, the "special needs" of adult rehabilitation. See also In re Tyrell J. 876 
P.2d 519, 530 (Cal. 1994) where the California Supreme Court analyzed the best 
methods for the effectuation of juvenile rehabilitation. 
165. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77. Since both probation and parole allow 
individuals who have been convicted of crimes to live outside of prison, so long as 
they meet certain conditions, the government must be able to know with a high 
degree of certainty that the conditions are being met. Id. The way in which the 
government ensures that these conditions are met is through the close relation-
ships between the probation/parole officers and the probationers/parolees. Id. 
166. Id. (discussing the competing interests at work which justify the "probation 
exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements). 
167. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 521-22. 
168. Id. The facts state that the second officer had to tell the searching officer 
that Tyrell J. was a member of the "U-Boys" gang. Id. It can be inferred from 
this that there was no ongoing supervisory relationship, as there appears to be no 
prior relationship at aU. 
169. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77. The Court required approval of the search by 
the supervisor of the probation officer before the search was conducted. Id. There-
fore, knowledge of the probationary status is a prerequisite for a valid search. Id. 
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by a police officer not involved in any supervision of the mi-
nor. 170 
There are no cases on record approving of a police officer, 
ignorant of the defendant's probation/parole status, searching 
an adult probationer/parolee without probable cause. l7l Fur-
thermore, in the dissenting opinion in Tyrell, Justice Kennard 
stated: 
even when the searching police officer knows of 
the existence of a search condition, reliance on 
the condition is improper when the officer acted 
in the capacity of an agent of the police, and the 
search was conducted for purposes of law en-
forcement, rather than for purposes related to 
probation or parole. 172 
Therefore, some justification other than the mere existence of 
the search condition should be required to validate the 
search. 173 
D. RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The In re Tyrell J. majority emphasized that its conclusion 
was "consistent with the primary purpose of the exclusionary 
rule."174 The court carefully articulated this purpose as the 
deterrence of police misconduct. 175 Any juvenile whq is not 
subject to a probation search condition could successfully have 
any evidence uncovered in a search excluded. 176 The majority 
170. Id. The Court was careful to discuss the need for rehabilitation within the 
probationary system. Id. This need relies on close supervision of the rehabilitation 
process. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77. 
171. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 532 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
The dissent reports that a comprehensive search was conducted an no case law 
support was uncovered. Id. at 534. 
172. Id. at 534 (citing United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 
1991), United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 1991), United States 
v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1985». 
173. See id. 
174. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 531. 
175. Id. at 531 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) as a good 
discussion of deterrence). 
176 .. Id. at 531-32 ("If it had turned out that the minor was not subject to a 
search condition, any contraband found in the search of the minor would have 
been inadmissible in court."). 
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reasoned that because of this exclusion, police will continue to 
use great care to establish probable cause to search. l77 
This argument is misguided, particularly in light of the 
court's complete refusal to adopt the same kind of "knowledge 
first" rule for juvenile probation searches as exist with 
adults. l78 This "search first and ask questions later" poli-
cyl79 may in fact defeat the deterrent purpose that the major-
ity relied upon in reaching its conclusion. The deterrent pur-
pose will not be furthered by police and courts becoming in-
volved with larger numbers of searches which result in inad-
missible evidence. By bringing more cases to trial which are 
then dismissed because of insufficient evidence, after suppres-
sion, law breaking could be increased by individuals willing to 
take their chances with dismissal. 
The majority's reasoning stressed the interests of police 
efficiency and judicial economy.l80 However, because police 
officers can now "get lucky" on a warrantless search, if the 
youth turns out to be on probation, police may be encouraged 
to make warrantless searches of juveniles.181 Consequently, 
the number of suppression hearings could increase if prosecu-
tors attempt to use this "later discovered" evidence.182 Con-
trary to the court's proffered goal, this will increase rather 
than lessen police and judicial workloads. 
177. Id. at 531-32. The majority assumes that the possibility of exclusion of evi-
dence when the juvenile is not subject to a search condition provided sufficient 
incentive to avoid improperly invading the privacy of other. Id. 
178. See People v. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 174, 177-78 (Cal. 1964) (Schauer, J., dis-
senting), for a discussion of the dangers of allowing a "search first-ask later" poli-
cy. 
179. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 537 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
180. See id. at 531-32. The majority discusses the sufficiency of the incentives 
to law enforcement officers to try to avoid improper searches. Id. 
181. Id. at 532. Justice Kennard states: "[t)oday's holding offers police officers 
and incentive to 8earch any juvenile despite the lack of probable cause and a 
warrant, for if it later turns out that the juvenile has a probation search condi-
tion, the fruits of the search will be admissible in court." [d. 
182. Id. "[The majority's) holding offers police officers an incentive to search any 
juvenile despite the lack of probable cause and a warrant .. ." Id. at 537. If this 
result is realized, the numbers of suppression hearings will clearly increase. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In In re Tyrell J., the California Supreme Court strayed 
from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 183 The California Supreme Court re-
moved the requirement of "prior knowledge" of the searching 
officer when a juvenile is detained. 184 The court broadened 
the standards previously required to show proof of a "reason-
able belief' in the presence of contraband. 185 Additionally, the 
In re Tyrell J. court reinterpreted existing protocol for proba-
tion searches by allowing searches by police officers uninvolved 
in the rehabilitation process. 186 The California Supreme 
Court thus moved closer to finding justification for limiting 
other rights of California citizens.187 The broadening of the 
"special needs" exception created a situation whereby an excep-
tion can swallow the entire rule.188 
Additionally, in In re Tyrell J., the court was presented 
with a novel opportunity to clarify some of the ongoing confu-
sion surrounding the juvenile justice system. 189 Instead of 
183. See U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868 (1987); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960). These decisions involve rea-
soning whereby the United States Supreme Court carved out exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule found within the Fourth Amendment. The exceptions are very 
precisely worded and narrowly drawn. For discussion on these exceptions, see su-
pra notes 126, 26, & 31-32 and accompanying text. In contrast, the California 
Supreme Court in In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994), painted an exception 
with a much broader stroke. They admitted evidence from a juvenile probationer's 
search conducted by an officer ignorant of the search conditions. 
184. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 521. The California Supreme Court acknowledged a 
split among lower courts as to whether an officer ignorant of the juvenile 
probationer's status was justified in conducting a warrantless search. Id. In vali-
dating Tyrell's search, the court removed any knowledge requirement. 
185. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. The Tyrell court side-
stepped the Griffin, 483 U.S. 868, requirement that the police have a "reasonable 
belief' in the presence of contraband before the search is commenced. Id. (empha-
sis added). The result of this is a broadening of the "reasonableness standard." See 
id. 
186. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
187. See Bill Kisliuk, Police Given More Power to Search Juvenile Suspects; 
Court OKs Illegal Search, Youth Was on Probation, THE RECORDER, July 19, 1984, 
at 1 ("You are not going to see any cases that extend the Fourth Amendment 
from the California Supreme Court at this point."). 
188. See id. at 2 (stating the opinions of several San Francisco defense attor-
neys on the future ramifications of the Tyrell decision). 
189. See Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Criminal Law: Prosecuting Juve-
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meeting that challenge, the court perpetuated the protective 
and ineffective program of the "child savers.,,190 It appears 
that the children of California must look elsewhere for "jus-
tice." 
Shelley Davis' 
niles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. 439 at 
457 (1985). The authors discuss the substantial changes occurring within the juve-
nile justice system and the lack of clarity as to what direction is being taken. 1d. 
190. Roger B. McNally, Nearly a Century Later: the Child Savers - Child Advo-
cates and the Juvenile Justice System, 33 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 47 (1982). 
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